Ecological validity, representative design, and correspondence between experimental task constraints and behavioral setting:: Comment on Rogers, Kadar, and Costall (2005)
Ecological validity, representative design, and correspondence between experimental task constraints and behavioral setting:: Comment on Rogers, Kadar, and Costall (2005)
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DOI：
10.1080/10407410709336951
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发表时间：
2007-01-01
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Passos, Pedro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Araujo, Duarte;Davids, Keith;Passos, Pedro
在最近一期的《生态心理学》中，Rogers、Kadar和Costall(2005)使用生态有效性一词，讨论了他们使用的模拟器如何通过复制自然的道路驾驶行为来提供数据。然而，正如布伦斯威克(1956)所设想的那样，生态有效性是指线索(即感知变量)在预测环境的标准状态时的有效性。像过去的其他心理学家一样，罗杰斯等人。(2005)将这一术语与布伦斯瑞克的另一个术语：代表性设计混淆了。在这篇评论中，作者澄清了这些概念之间的区别，并讨论了吉布森的思想如何加强对实验任务限制和实验室外行为环境之间的对应关系的理解。这种理论合理化的主要含义是在实验和行为背景之间发展可测量的对应关系，使对生物体和环境的合理概括能够超越特定实验的界限。
Using the term ecological validity, in a recent issue of Ecological Psychology, Rogers, Kadar, and Costall (2005) discussed how the simulator they used could provide data by replicating natural road driving behaviors. However, ecological validity, as Brunswik (1956) conceived it, refers to the validity of a cue (i.e., perceptual variable) in predicting a criterion state of the environment. Like other psychologists in the past, Rogers et al. (2005) confused this term with another of Brunswik's terms: representative design. In this comment, the authors clarify the distinction between these concepts and also discuss how Gibsonian ideas can strengthen understanding of the correspondence between experimental task constraints and behavioral settings outside the laboratory. The main implication of this theoretical rationalization is for the development of a measurable correspondence between experimental and behavioral contexts, enabling defensible generalization to both organisms and environments beyond the bounds of particular experiments.