Fixing Cracks in the Concrete: Random Oracles with Auxiliary Input, Revisited
Fixing Cracks in the Concrete: Random Oracles with Auxiliary Input, Revisited
复制标题
修复混凝土裂缝:重新审视带有辅助输入的随机预言
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-56614-6_16
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发表时间:
2017
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Jonathan Katz
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Y. Dodis;Siyao Guo;Jonathan Katz
We revisit the security of cryptographic primitives in the random-oracle model against attackers having a bounded amount of auxiliary information about the random oracle. This situation arises most naturally when an attacker carries out offline preprocessing to generate state (namely, auxiliary information) that is later used as part of an on-line attack, with perhaps the best-known example being the use of rainbow tables for function inversion. The resulting model is also critical to obtain accurate bounds against non-uniform attackers when the random oracle is instantiated by a concrete hash function.