Extended Producer Responsibility for E-Waste: Individual or Collective Producer Responsibility?
Extended Producer Responsibility for E-Waste: Individual or Collective Producer Responsibility?
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01327.x
复制
发表时间：
2012-11-01
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Subramanian, Ravi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Atasu, Atalay;Subramanian, Ravi
我们研究了电子废物产品回收法律的集体生产者责任（CPR）和个体生产者责任（IPR）模式分别对制造商的产品回收设计（DfR）选择和利润，以及在存在产品竞争情况下对消费者剩余的影响。我们表明，与CPR相比，IPR提供了更优的DfR激励，并提供了公平的竞争环境。CPR可能会扭曲竞争，并允许在DfR努力上搭便车以降低产品回收成本。因此，由于CPR下存在搭便车的影响，制造商对IPR或CPR的偏好可能不同，甚至高端制造商在某些竞争条件下也有搭便车的动机。从经济福利的角度来看，IPR和CPR之间的政策选择并不明确。这种选择涉及在IPR下通过改进DfR实现更好的回收成本降低效果与CPR下的运营成本效率之间的比较。
We investigate the implications of collective and individual producer responsibility (CPR and IPR, respectively) models of product take-back laws for e-waste on manufacturers' design for product recovery (DfR) choices and profits, and on consumer surplus in the presence of product competition. We show that IPR offers superior DfR incentives as compared to CPR, and provides a level competitive ground. CPR may distort competition and allow free-riding on DfR efforts to reduce product recovery costs. Thus, manufacturer preferences for IPR or CPR may differ because of the free-riding implications under CPR, with even high-end manufacturers having incentives to free-ride under certain competitive conditions. The policy choice between IPR and CPR is not clear cut from an economic welfare perspective. This choice involves a comparison between the effects of superior recovery cost reduction through improved DfR under IPR and the operational cost-efficiency under CPR.