Controlling Violence by the Dominant Coalition: A Comparative Study of the Philippines (Mindanao) and Myanmar
Controlling Violence by the Dominant Coalition: A Comparative Study of the Philippines (Mindanao) and Myanmar
复制标题
主导联盟控制暴力：菲律宾（棉兰老岛）和缅甸的比较研究
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-031-05756-4_8
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Uesugi Yuji
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ishikawa Shin-ichi;Romano Mia;Hudson Jennifer L.;Uesugi Yuji
在本章中，有限获取秩序（LAO）和开放获取秩序（OAO）被用来作为一个概念框架，分析两个建设和平的案例在东南亚：菲律宾（棉兰老岛）和缅甸。主要的假设是，国家主导联盟依靠国家精英与其附属社区的对应方之间的赞助人-客户关系来控制老挝人民民主共和国的暴力。本章探讨了三个关键的门槛条件的重要性-法治的精英，在公共和私人领域的永久性组织，并巩固与暴力能力的组织的政治控制，建立在这两种情况下的领土内的暴力控制。本章认为，当国家精英能够发现限制暴力并使持续的社会互动成为可能以维护其特权和既得利益对他们有利时，暴力就更有可能得到控制。这两个案例研究还表明，“租金”（精英用来达成共识或维持联盟的物质利益）被用来限制暴力和协调有权势的个人和组织的利益。
In this chapter, limited access order (LAO) and open access order (OAO) are used as a conceptual framework for analyzing two peacebuilding cases in Southeast Asia: the Philippines (Mindanao) and Myanmar. The main hypothesis is that the national dominant coalition (NDC) relies on patron–client relationships between national elites and their counterparts in subsidiary communities to control violence in LAOs. The chapter examines the importance of the three key doorstep conditions—the rule of law for elites, perpetually lived organizations in the public and private spheres, and consolidated political control of the organizations with violent capacity—for establishing control of the violence within the territory in these two cases. The chapter suggests that violence is more likely to be controlled when national elites can find it to their advantage to limit violence and make sustained social interaction possible in order to preserve their privileges and vested interests. The two case studies also demonstrate that “rents” (material benefits that the elites use to forge a consensus or to maintain the coalition among them) are used to limit violence and to coordinate the interests of powerful individuals and organizations.