A refutation of Penrose's Godelian case against artificial intelligence
A refutation of Penrose's Godelian case against artificial intelligence
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DOI：
10.1080/09528130050111455
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发表时间：
2000-07-01
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Xiao, H
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bringsjord, S;Xiao, H
人们普遍认为，彭罗斯在《皇帝的新思维》（The Emperor's New Mind）中阐述的哥德尔式攻击未能摧毁计算性的思维概念，但他在《思维的阴影》（Shadows of the Mind）的第二章和第三章中提出了一个更精细、更挑剔的哥德尔式案例。这些宪章的核心论点是感性的，当形式化时，大量的技术故障就会暴露出来。除了这些缺陷之外，这个论证充其量只是否认前件谬误、原则性谬误或模棱两可谬误的一个例子。最近，彭罗斯在电子杂志《心灵》上回应批评他的人时，提出了一个哥德尔式的案例，旨在改进SOTM中的版本。但这个版本又是一个失败。在成为我们发现的错误的牺牲品时，彭罗斯的新哥德尔案例被揭露为同样令人困惑的重复J。卢卡斯于35年前发起。
Having, as it is generally agreed, failed to destroy the computational conception of mind with the Godelian attack he articulated in his The Emperor's New Mind, Penrose has returned, armed with a more elaborate and more fastidious Godelian case, expressed in Chapters 2 and 3 of his Shadows of the Mind. The core argument in these charters is enthymematic, and when formalized, a remarkable number of technical glitches come to light. Over and above these defects, the argument, at best, is an instance of either the fallacy of denying the antecedent, the fallacy of petitio principii, or the fallacy of equivocation. More recently, writing in response to his critics in the electronic journal Psyche, Penrose has offered a Godelian case designed to improve on the version presented in SOTM. But this version is yet again another failure. In falling prey to the errors we uncover, Penrose's new Godelian case is unmasked as the same confused refrain J. R. Lucas initiated 35 years ago.