The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (review)
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (review)
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大国政治的悲剧（评论）
DOI：
10.1162/jcws.2005.7.3.149
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发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
W. Hixson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Hixson
比如拉里·劳登的（第154-157页）。Moravcsik在他的章节中强烈支持“背景理论新颖性”（第177ff页）而不是“启发式新颖性”，他通过提出许多自由-现实主义合成器的反例，攻击了Elmans关于现实主义不可变核心的版本。其中一些可能被描述为“在不一致的基础上取得进展”（拉卡托斯自己的说法）。沃克和班尼特显然也被劳登关于“理论复合体”问题的创新和奉献的元理论叙述所吸引。施韦勒赞同地引用了杰维斯的观点，即rp是“出了名的难以让人信服或失望”，它们的成功（或失败）与“我们在智力和政治上吸引什么样的理论”有很大关系（第314页）。瓦斯奎兹提出了一种与启蒙运动相关的知识积累术语对科学进步的多标准评估，他建议综合拉卡托斯和托马斯·库恩（正如瓦斯奎兹所说，库恩主张在知识渊博的科学家中进行理性说服，并赞赏个人和不同应用的标准，如“准确性、范围、简单性、丰收性等”）。库恩并没有像埃尔曼在他们的图2-1中所说的那样提倡非理性；相反，他反对将科学家对理论的选择描述为“类似于逻辑或形式数学中的证明”的过程（即，理论选择的演绎、形式“度量”）。如果这些作者对冷战历史的特殊性有更多的看法，为德斯勒所说的“对相关历史条件更准确、更恰当的描述”（第396页）做出实实在在的贡献，那不是很好吗？弗里德里希·克拉托威尔最近在《科学的独白》一文中，《国际研究评论》第5卷第1期（2003年3月），第124 - 153页，雄辩地阐述了斯蒂芬·图尔敏在伊姆雷·拉卡托斯和艾伦·马斯格雷夫主编中所表达的观点。，《批判与知识的增长》（纽约：剑桥大学出版社，1970），第39-48页。Kratochwil详细阐述了Toulmin的论点，他认为“科学家之间的争论必须遵循公平的程序标准，这样才能确定有争议证据的分量。”恰当的比喻不再是（正式的）演示，甚至不是辩论，而是像法庭程序一样的结构化程序。”这种观点在埃尔曼的书中找不到。
such as Larry Lauden’s (pp. 154–157). Moravcsik in his chapter makes a strong case for preferring “background theory novelty” (pp. 177ff ) over “heuristic novelty,” and he attacks the Elmans’ version of the immutable hard core of realism by presenting many counterexamples of liberal-realist synthesizers. Some of this may be described as “progressing on inconsistent foundations” (Lakatos’s own phrase). Walker and Bennett clearly are also attracted to Lauden’s metatheoretical account of inoation and deoation of problems regarding “theory complexes.” Schweller approvingly cites Jervis’s recognition that RPs are “notoriously difacult to conarm or disconarm,” and that their success (or lack thereof ) has a lot to do with “what kinds of theories we and intellectually and politically appealing” (p. 314). Vasquez proposes a multi-standard assessment of scientiac progress in Enlightenment-linked knowledge cumulation terms, and he suggests synthesizing Lakatos and Thomas Kuhn (who, as Vasquez says, argues for rational persuasion among knowledgeable scientists and appreciates individually and diversely applied standards such as “accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like”). Kuhn did not advocate irrationality as the Elmans claim in their agure 2–1; on the contrary, he was against describing scientists’ choice of theories as a process that “resembles a proof in logic or formal mathematics” (i.e., a deductive, formal “metric” of theory choice). Wouldn’t it be nice if these authors had more to say about the speciacs of Cold War history, making solid contributions to what Dessler describes as “more accurate and appropriate descriptions of the relevant historical conditions” (p. 396). Friedrich Kratochwil recently provided—in “The Monologue of ‘Science,’” International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 2003), pp. 124–153—an eloquent statement of a view arst expressed by Stephen Toulmin in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 39–48. Elaborating on Toulmin’s thesis, Kratochwil argues that “debates among scientists themselves have to be informed by procedural standards of fairness so that the weight of controversial evidence can be ascertained. The appropriate metaphor is no longer that of [formal] demonstration, not even that of debate, but of a structured procedure [like] a courtroom proceeding.” This view is nowhere to be found in the Elmans’ volume.