Self-financed wagering mechanisms for forecasting
Self-financed wagering mechanisms for forecasting
复制标题
自筹资金的预测投注机制
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
David M. Pennock
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nicolas S. Lambert;J. Langford;Jennifer Wortman Vaughan;Yiling Chen;Daniel M. Reeves;Y. Shoham;David M. Pennock
我们研究了一类赌博机制，旨在从一群人中引出真实的预测，而不需要任何外部补贴。我们提出了一些可取的属性投注机制，确定一个机制-加权评分投注-满足所有的属性。此外，我们表明，一个单一的参数概括加权评分投注是唯一的机制，满足这些属性。我们探讨了一些变种的核心机制的基础上实际的考虑。
We examine a class of wagering mechanisms designed to elicit truthful predictions from a group of people without requiring any outside subsidy. We propose a number of desirable properties for wagering mechanisms, identifying one mechanism - weighted-score wagering - that satisfies all of the properties. Moreover, we show that a single-parameter generalization of weighted-score wagering is the only mechanism that satisfies these properties. We explore some variants of the core mechanism based on practical considerations.