Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas
Trust and Reactions to Messages of Intent in Social Dilemmas
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社会困境中对意图信息的信任和反应
DOI：
10.1177/0022002796040001007
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发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Shawn D. Scamahorn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Parks;Robin Henager;Shawn D. Scamahorn
本研究探讨了低信任和高信任的个人如何在社会困境的情况下对预期行为的信息作出反应。受试者扮演一个两人的囚徒困境;对手是一个互惠策略编程的实验者。在游戏过程中，受试者收到一条消息，表明对手计划在游戏的剩余时间内合作或竞争。在研究1中，低信任者对竞争信息的反应是减少合作，但不受合作信息的影响;高信任者对合作信息的反应是增加合作，但不受竞争信息的影响。研究2表明，一段时间的无条件的，信息一致的行为后立即消息可以使低和高信任的合作和竞争的消息，分别作出反应。然而，无条件答复的数量至关重要。研究还发现，陈述的意图和信息不一致的行为会影响对对手可信度的看法。
This study examined how low- and high-trust individuals react to messages of intended behavior in a social dilemma situation. Subjects played a two-person prisoner's dilemma; the opponent was a reciprocal strategy programmed by the experimenter. During the game, subjects received a message stating that the opponent planned to be cooperative or competitive for the remainder of the game. In Study 1, low trusters reacted to the competitive message by decreasing cooperation but were unaffected by the cooperative message; high trusters reacted to the cooperative message by increasing cooperation but were unaffected by the competitive message. Study 2 showed that a period of unconditional, message-consistent behavior immediately after the message can make low and high trusters responsive to cooperative and competitive messages, respectively. However, the number of unconditional responses was crucial. The study also found that stated intention and message-inconsistent behavior affect perceptions of the opponent's trustworthiness.