Judicial Performance and the Rule of Law in the Mexican States
Judicial Performance and the Rule of Law in the Mexican States
复制标题
墨西哥各州的司法绩效和法治
DOI：
10.1111/j.1548-2456.2006.tb00355.x
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Caroline C. Beer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Caroline C. Beer
摘要是什么决定了司法机构的运作方式？国际政治经济学、制度理性选择、社会资本和结构理论等著名的理论方法表明，国际经济行为体、政治竞争、政治参与和贫困都可能是推动制度行为的重要力量。本研究分析了这些不同的理论方法，并采用定性和统计分析比较墨西哥各州的司法表现。它为支持政治竞争产生司法独立的制度理性选择假设提供了证据。贫困、政治参与和出口导向型经济似乎影响到司法的可及性和有效性。
Abstract What determines how judicial institutions perform? Prominent theoretical approaches, such as international political economy, institutional rational choice, social capital, and structural theories, suggest that international economic actors, political competition, political participation, and poverty may all be important forces driving institutional behavior. This study analyzes these various theoretical approaches and uses qualitative and statistical analysis to compare judicial performance in the Mexican states. It provides evidence to support the institutional rational choice hypothesis that political competition generates judicial independence. Poverty, political participation, and an export-oriented economy seem to influence judicial access and effectiveness.