Nash-Implementation of the No-Envy Solution on Symmetric Domains of Economies
Nash-Implementation of the No-Envy Solution on Symmetric Domains of Economies
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经济对称域上无嫉妒解的纳什实现
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2637965
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Battal Doğan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Battal Doğan
我们表明，一个简单的游戏形式，它类似于“划分和选择”的程序，纳什实现了无嫉妒的解决方案的经济领域的一组可行的分配是对称的（分配获得的可行的分配互换任何两个代理的束也是可行的）和偏好是完整的（每个代理可以比较任何两个束）。我们的结果扩展了Thomson（2005）的结果，并且适用于广泛的模型，包括经典的公平分配模型、一维单峰模型、蛋糕分割模型和具有货币转移的不可分割对象分配模型。我们表明，即使当偏好表现出消费外部性，扩展的无嫉妒的解决方案是纳什可实现的一般域的经济。
We show that a simple game form, which resembles the “Divide-and-Choose” procedure, Nash-implements the no-envy solution on domains of economies where the set of feasible allocations is symmetric (an allocation obtained from a feasible allocation by interchanging the bundles of any two agents is also feasible) and preferences are complete (each agent can compare any two bundles). Our result extends a result by Thomson (2005) and it is applicable to a wide class of models including the classical model of fair allocation, the unidimensional single-peaked model, cake division model, and allocation of indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We show that, even when the preferences exhibit consumption externalities, an extension of the no-envy solution is Nash-implementable on general domains of economies.