Campaign contributions and innovation in a fully-endogenous quality-ladder model
Campaign contributions and innovation in a fully-endogenous quality-ladder model
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完全内生的质量阶梯模型中的活动贡献和创新
DOI：
10.1007/s41685-018-0080-6
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Kenichiro Ikeshita
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ken-ichi Hashimoto;Ryonghun Im;Takuma Kunieda;Akihisa Shibata;Kenichiro Ikeshita
本文使用完全内生的质量阶梯模型考察了竞选捐款对专利政策、福利和创新的影响。假设两种类型的家庭，其中一种类型持有专利，另一种没有，我们分析了这两个群体之间的政治冲突。我们的分析表明，当创新最大化的专利政策足够强时，从社会福利的角度来看，竞选捐款会过度提高创新率。这一结果的重要性在于，从社会福利的观点来看，被竞选献金扭曲的创新率可能过高。
This paper examines the effect of campaign contributions on patent policy, welfare, and innovation using a fully-endogenous quality-ladder model. Assuming two types of households, where one type holds patents and the other does not, we analyze political conflicts between the two groups. Our analysis shows campaign contributions increase the rate of innovation to an excessive level from the viewpoint of social welfare when the innovation-maximizing patent policy is sufficiently strong. This result is important because it implies that the rate of innovation distorted by campaign contributions can be too high from the viewpoint of social welfare.