Hypothetical knowledge and counterfactual reasoning
Hypothetical knowledge and counterfactual reasoning
复制标题
假设知识和反事实推理
DOI：
10.1007/s001820050113
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发表时间：
2000
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Joseph Y. Halpern
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Joseph Y. Halpern
抽象。萨米特引入了假设知识的概念，并展示了如何使用它来捕获在完全信息博弈中强制逆向归纳解决方案所需的反事实推理类型。他认为，虽然假设知识和用来模拟它的扩展信息结构与哲学家使用条件逻辑来模拟反事实的方式有一些相似之处，但假设知识不能被简化为条件逻辑和认知逻辑。在这里，它表明，事实上假设的知识可以使用标准的反事实运算符“>”和知识运算符“K”，只要一些假设是关于两者之间的相互作用。然而，有人认为，这些假设是不合理的，因为是公理，从他们遵循。博弈论的一些影响进行了讨论。
Abstract. Samet introduced a notion of hypothetical knowledge and showed how it could be used to capture the type of counterfactual reasoning necessary to force the backwards induction solution in a game of perfect information. He argued that while hypothetical knowledge and the extended information structures used to model it bear some resemblance to the way philosophers have used conditional logic to model counterfactuals, hypothetical knowledge cannot be reduced to conditional logic together with epistemic logic. Here it is shown that in fact hypothetical knowledge can be captured using the standard counterfactual operator “>” and the knowledge operator “K”, provided that some assumptions are made regarding the interaction between the two. It is argued, however, that these assumptions are unreasonable in general, as are the axioms that follow from them. Some implications for game theory are discussed.