Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market
Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.99.5.1689
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发表时间：
2009-12-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Weiss, Yoram
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chiappori, Pierre-Andre;Iyigun, Murat;Weiss, Yoram
我们提出了一个模型，其中对学校教育的投资产生两种回报：劳动力市场回报（由更高的工资带来）和婚姻市场回报（定义为学校教育对人们可以提取的婚姻剩余份额的影响）。由于市场工资或家庭角色不同，男性和女性可能有不同的动机投资于教育。这种不对称性可能会产生混合平衡，一些受过教育的人与未受过教育的配偶结婚。当劳动力市场上的教育回归率上升、家庭生产所需的时间减少、传统的配偶分工规范减弱时，女性可能会比男性更多地投资于教育。 (JEL I21、J12、J24、J31)
We present a model in which investment in schooling generates two kinds of returns: the labor-market return, resulting from higher wages, and a marriage-market return, defined as the impact of schooling on the marital surplus share one can extract. Men and women may have different incentives to invest in schooling because of different market wages or household roles. This asymmetry can yield a mixed equilibrium with some educated individuals marrying uneducated spouses. When the labor-market return to schooling rises, home production demands less time, and the traditional spousal labor division norms weaken, more women may invest in schooling than men. (JEL I21, J12, J24, J31)