Threats or Promises? A Built-in Mechanism of Gradual Reciprocal Trade Liberalization
Threats or Promises? A Built-in Mechanism of Gradual Reciprocal Trade Liberalization
复制标题
威胁还是承诺？
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00567.x
复制
发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Taiji Furusawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
大野泉;村嶋美穂;Taiji Furusawa
我们分析了两个大国以交替的动作进行的无限重复的关税设定游戏。我们关注的是每个国家根据另一个国家关税的固定函数来选择自己的关税的子博弈完全均衡。我们证明了有许多具有两个稳态的均衡，一个具有较高的关税（但仍然低于静态纳什关税），另一个具有较低的关税。我们还证明了存在一类特殊的均衡，其中存在一个唯一的、全局稳定的稳态。在这两种均衡中，一个国家单方面从静态纳什均衡中降低关税，另一个国家回应第一个国家的隐性“承诺”进一步降低关税，这个过程永远持续下去，收敛到一个关税低于静态纳什关税的稳定状态。因此，承诺而不是威胁会促使各国逐渐降低关税。
We analyze an infinitely repeated tariff-setting game played by two large countries with alternating moves. We focus on the subgame perfect equilibria in which each country chooses its tariff according to a stationary function of the other country’s tariff. We show that there are many equilibria with two steady states, one with higher tariffs (but still lower than the static Nash tariffs), the other with lower tariffs. We also show that there is a special class of equilibria in which there exists a unique, globally stable steady state. In both types of equilibria, one country unilaterally reduces its tariff from the static Nash equilibrium, the other country reciprocates in response to the first country’s implicit “promise” to lower its tariff even further, and this process continues forever, converging to a steady state with tariffs lower than the static Nash tariffs. Therefore, promises, rather than threats, induce countries to gradually reduce their tariffs.