Conditional Cooperation and Turn-Taking in Parental Care
Conditional Cooperation and Turn-Taking in Parental Care
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DOI：
10.3389/fevo.2019.00335
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发表时间：
2019-10-04
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
Savage, James L.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Johnstone, Rufus A.;Savage, James L.
当双亲照顾后代时，性冲突不可避免，因为提供照顾对个体而言代价高昂，而成功繁殖的益处却由双方共享。以往将亲代投资视为一种连续性状的模型，认为亲代在进化或行为时间尺度上协商出稳定的投入水平，这些模型通常预测性冲突会导致对幼体的投资不足，因为每一位亲代都可能通过让其伴侣承担更大比例的照顾成本而获益。最近，一个将亲代投资视为重复离散贡献的模型表明，通过亲代采用一种“轮流”的有条件合作的简单策略可以达成更有效的结果：即在其伴侣每次做出贡献之后才进行投资。然而，尽管实证研究表明在许多自然系统中亲代的探视行为存在显著的交替，但到目前为止所有的例子都呈现出不完美的轮流，而非理论所预测的严格规则。为了帮助弥合这一差距，我们在此提出一个更符合现实的亲代轮流的数学模型，该模型包含了（i）亲代监测其伴侣贡献能力的误差，（ii）提供照顾的成本和收益随时间变化的情况，（iii）伴侣之间在收益（以及相应行为）上的差异，（iv）伴侣之间在监测彼此行为的准确性上的差异，以及（v）照顾的共同成本。我们阐述了这些因素中的每一个是如何影响有条件合作的程度的，并讨论了对我们的模型进行实证检验的方法。
Sexual conflict is inescapable when two parents care for offspring, because providing care is personally costly, while the benefits of successful reproduction are shared. Previous models that treat parental investment as a continuous trait, with stable levels of effort negotiated between parents over evolutionary or behavioral time, generally predict that sexual conflict will lead to under-investment in the young, as each parent stands to gain by leaving its partner to bear a greater share of the costs of care. More recently, a model of parental investment as repeated discrete contributions suggested that a more efficient outcome can be reached through parents adopting a simple strategy of conditional cooperation by "turn-taking": only investing after each contribution by their partner. However, while empirical work suggests that parental visits are significantly alternated in a number of natural systems, all examples thus far exhibit imperfect turn-taking rather than the strict rule predicted by theory. To help bridge this gap, we here present a more realistic mathematical model of parental turn-taking, incorporating (i) errors in parents' ability to monitor the contributions of their partner, (ii) time-dependent costs and benefits of delivering care, (iii) differences between partners in payoffs (and consequently in behavior), (iv) differences between partners in the accuracy with which they can monitor one another's behavior, and (v) shared costs of care. We illustrate how the degree of conditional cooperation is influenced by each of these factors, and discuss ways in which our model could be tested empirically.