Batch queues with choice of arrivals: Equilibrium analysis and experimental study
Batch queues with choice of arrivals: Equilibrium analysis and experimental study
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DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.008
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发表时间：
2007-05-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Zwick, Rami
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Stein, William E.;Rapoport, Amnon;Zwick, Rami
研究了两种具有内生到达和批量服务的排队博弈中智能体的决策问题。在这两款游戏中，代理都被要求独立决定何时加入队列，或者他们可能干脆选择不加入队列。在不同博弈类型（回避vs.不回避）和信息结构（私有vs.公共信息）的实验研究中，两个博弈在离散时间（禁止回避和允许回避）下的对称混合策略均衡。随着阶段博弈的反复迭代，所有四种实验条件都会导致总体行为（而非个体行为）接近混合策略均衡。个体行为可以用相对简单的启发式来解释。(c) 2006爱思唯尔公司版权所有。
We study the decisions agents make in two queueing games with endogenously determined arrivals and batch service. In both games, agents are asked to independently decide when to join a queue, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. The symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of two games in discrete time where balking is prohibited and where it is allowed are tested experimentally in a study that varies the game type (balking vs. no balking) and information structure (private vs. public information). With repeated iterations of the stage game, all four experimental conditions result in aggregate, but not individual, behavior approaching mixed-strategy equilibrium play. Individual behavior can be accounted for by relatively simple heuristics. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.