The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors
The evolutionary origin of cooperators and defectors
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DOI：
10.1126/science.1101456
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发表时间：
2004-10-29
期刊：
影响因子：
56.9
通讯作者：
Killingback, T
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Doebeli, M;Hauert, C;Killingback, T
合作者和叛逃者共存在自然界中很常见，但这种社会多样化的进化起源尚不清楚。许多模型的研究都是基于合作行为的利益只对他人产生的假设。这里，我们分析了连续雪堆博弈，在这种博弈中，合作投资是昂贵的，但对其他人和合作者都有好处。投资水平的自适应动态往往导致进化多样化，从最初的均匀种群到稳定状态，在这种状态下，投资大的合作者与投资少的叛逃者共存。因此，当个人从自己的行为中受益时，合作投资中的巨大不对称就会演变。
Coexistence of cooperators and defectors is common in nature, yet the evolutionary origin of such social diversification is unclear. Many models have been studied on the basis of the assumption that benefits of cooperative acts only accrue to others. Here, we analyze the continuous snowdrift game, in which cooperative investments are costly but yield benefits to others as well as to the cooperator. Adaptive dynamics of investment levels often result in evolutionary diversification from initially uniform populations to a stable state in which cooperators making large investments coexist with defectors who invest very little. Thus, when individuals benefit from their own actions, large asymmetries in cooperative investments can evolve.