Strategic Investment in International Gas-Transport Systems: A Dynamic Analysis of the Hold-Up Problem
Strategic Investment in International Gas-Transport Systems: A Dynamic Analysis of the Hold-Up Problem
复制标题
国际天然气运输系统的战略投资：滞留问题的动态分析
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Irina Suleymanova
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Hubert;Irina Suleymanova
我们开发了一个动态模型的战略投资在跨国管道系统。在没有国际合同执行的情况下，各国可能会扭曲投资，以增加其讨价还价的能力，导致对昂贵管道的过度投资和对廉价管道的投资不足。然而，在反复互动的情况下，有可能通过动态共谋来提高效率。在理论部分，我们建立了一个基本的不对称性：避免过度投资比避免投资不足更容易。校准模型，以适应欧亚天然气管道系统，我们发现，通过动态合作，提高效率的潜力很大。然而，实际上，与非合作解决办法相比，只取得了有限的改进。
We develop a dynamic model of strategic investment in a transnational pipeline system. In the absence of international contract enforcement, countries may distort investment in order to increase their bargaining power, resulting in overinvestment in expensive and underinvestment in cheap pipelines. With repeated interaction, however, there is a potential to increase efficiency through dynamic collusion. In the theoretical part we establish a fundamental asymmetry: it is easier to avoid overinvestment than underinvestment. Calibrating the model to fit the Eurasian pipeline system for natural gas, we find that the potential to improve efficiency through dynamic cooperation is large. In reality, however, only modest improvements over the non-cooperative solution have been achieved.