The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences
The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences
复制标题
特殊科学的因果自主性
DOI：
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.003.0008
复制
发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
C. List
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Menzies;C. List
在特殊科学中研究的系统通常被认为是因果自治的，在这个意义上，它们的高级属性具有独立于其更基本物理属性的因果能力的因果能力。这一观点得到了英国新兴主义者的支持，他们声称，达到一定组织复杂性水平的系统具有独特的因果力量，这些力量来自其组成要素，但不是来自它们。最近，非还原的物理主义者也支持关于特殊科学性质的因果自主性的类似观点。他们认为，由于这些属性通常可以有多个物理实现，它们与物理属性不相同，而且它们具有与其物理实现者不同的因果能力。尽管这一观点是正统的，但很难找到一个明确的解释其含义或辩护它在一个动机良好的帐户的因果关系。在本文中，我们的目标是解决这个差距，在文献中澄清了什么是隐含的学说的因果关系自治的特殊科学属性，并捍卫学说使用一个突出的因果关系理论从科学哲学。
The systems studied in the special sciences are often said to be causally autonomous, in the sense that their higher-level properties have causal powers that are independent of the causal powers of their more basic physical properties. This view was espoused by the British emergentists, who claimed that systems achieving a certain level of organizational complexity have distinctive causal powers that emerge from their constituent elements but do not derive from them. More recently, non-reductive physicalists have espoused a similar view about the causal autonomy of special-science properties. They argue that since these properties can typically have multiple physical realizations, they are not identical to physical properties, and further they possess causal powers that differ from those of their physical realisers. Despite the orthodoxy of this view, it is hard to find a clear exposition of its meaning or a defence of it in terms of a well-motivated account of causation. In this paper, we aim to address this gap in the literature by clarifying what is implied by the doctrine of the causal autonomy of special-science properties and by defending the doctrine using a prominent theory of causation from the philosophy of science.