Influencing or Intervention? Impact of Constitutional Court Decisions on the Supreme Court in Indonesia
Influencing or Intervention? Impact of Constitutional Court Decisions on the Supreme Court in Indonesia
复制标题
影响还是干预？
DOI：
10.31078/consrev823
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发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Faiz Rahman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dian Agung Wicaksono;Faiz Rahman
2001年对印度尼西亚1945年《宪法》进行了第三次修正，对该国的司法机构产生了重大影响。它将司法机构从单一结构转变为双重结构。因此，司法机构有两个最高机构：最高法院和宪法法院。此外，宪法法院的设立将司法审查权划分给了两个最高法院。宪法法院可以审查法律是否违反《宪法》，而最高法院有权审查根据法律制定的条例是否与这些法律相抵触。虽然《印度尼西亚宪法》明确规定了司法审查的绝对权限，但司法审查的划分往往引发两个法院之间的紧张关系。《宪法》允许最高法院拥有法律赋予的额外权力。另一方面，宪法法院有权审查任何违反《宪法》的法律，包括与最高法院有关的法律。本文试图回答宪法法院是否可以通过司法审查影响或干预最高法院这一重要问题。提交人认为，司法审查权的双重性无意中造成了司法机关两个顶点之间职能关系的不平衡。主要原因是宪法法院可以通过违宪审查权影响或干预最高法院。提交人审查了这方面的两个基本方面：（1）司法审查权力的双重性的职能影响;（2）宪法法院审查法律的权力的实施，特别是与最高法院权力密切相关的法律。对各种案件进行了审查，以说明宪法法院如何能够直接或间接地影响最高法院的权力。然而，宪法法院却常常为了维护司法审查权的二元性所造成的司法关系失衡而显得“谨慎”。
The third amendment of Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution, conducted in 2001, had significant implications for the nation’s judiciary. It transformed the judiciary from a single to a dual structure. Consequently, there are two apexes of the judiciary: the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, the establishment of the Constitutional Court divided judicial review authority between the two apex courts. The Constitutional Court can review laws against the Constitution, while the Supreme Court has the power to review whether regulations, made under laws, contradict such laws. Although the Indonesian Constitution provides explicit delineations over the absolute competence of judicial review, the division of judicial review has often triggered tension between the two courts. The Constitution allows the Supreme Court to have additional authorities granted by laws. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court has the power to review any law against the Constitution, including laws related to the Supreme Court. This article seeks to answer the important question of whether the Constitutional Court could influence or intervene in the Supreme Court through judicial review. The authors argue that the duality of judicial review authority unintentionally causes an imbalance in the functional relationship between the two apexes of the judiciary. The main reason is that the Constitutional Court can influence or intervene in the Supreme Court through constitutional review authority. The authors examine two essential aspects of this: (1) the functional implications of duality of judicial review authority; and (2) the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s authority in reviewing laws, especially those closely related to the Supreme Court’s authorities. Various cases are examined to illustrate how the Constitutional Court could directly or indirectly influence the Supreme Courts’ authorities. The Constitutional Court, however, often seems to ‘play safe’ to maintain the judiciary’s imbalanced relationship caused by the dualism of judicial review authority.