Economics of Self-Feeding Fear
Economics of Self-Feeding Fear
复制标题
自我喂养恐惧的经济学
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hiroyuki Ozaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Nishimura;Hiroyuki Ozaki
提出了一种自我喂养的恐惧模型。假设一个经济主体 (1-fA) ~100% 确定她所面临的不确定性以特定的概率度量为特征，但她担心，在 fA ~100% 的概率下，她的信念是完全错误的，并且她对当前和未来的真实度量一无所知。我们将这种情况称为“A-信心污染”。在这种情况下，如果经济主体遵循贝叶斯程序或其变体（在经济学理论中被认为是理性的），那么她的信心在有了新的观察后就会减弱。
A model of self-feeding fear is presented. Suppose that an economic agent is (1-ƒA) ~100% certain that uncertainty she faces is characterized by a particular probability measure, but that she has a fear that, with ƒA ~100% chance, her conviction is completely wrong and she is left perfectly ignorant about the true measure in the present as well as in the future. We call this situation ƒA-contamination of confidence. In this situation, if the economic agent follows Bayesian procedure or its variant, which is considered as rational in the theory of economics, her confidence erodes after having new observation.