V-Range: Enabling Secure Ranging in 5G Wireless Networks

V-Range: Enabling Secure Ranging in 5G Wireless Networks
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DOI:
10.3929/ethz-b-000440601
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发表时间:
2022
期刊:
Proceedings 2022 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Mridula Singh;Marc Röschlin;Aanjhan Ranganathan;Srdjan Capkun
Mridula Singh;Marc Röschlin;Aanjhan Ranganathan;Srdjan Capkun
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
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作者:
Mridula Singh;Marc Röschlin;Aanjhan Ranganathan;Srdjan Capkun

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-一些安全和安保关键应用,如资产跟踪、智能生态系统、自动驾驶车辆和驾驶员辅助功能等,预计将受益于通过5G获得的位置信息。在支持如此广泛的位置感知服务和应用的目标推动下,当前发布的5G寻求将测距和定位[1]作为5G技术的组成部分进行探索。近年来,针对定位和测距系统的攻击已经多次出现,因此构建对距离和位置操纵攻击具有弹性的5G系统非常重要。无论是3GPP还是研究界,都没有现有的提案来解决5G中安全位置估计的挑战。在本文中,我们开发了V-Range,这是fi第一代安全测距系统,完全兼容5G标准,可以直接在现有的5G-NR收发器上实现。我们设计了V-Range系统,该系统能够执行安全的测距操作,对距离扩大和缩小攻击都具有弹性。我们通过实验验证了V-Range实现了高精度、低延迟,并且可以工作在5G的亚6 GHz和毫米波段。我们的结果表明,攻击者不可能在不被高概率检测的情况下减少或增加超过系统不精确度的距离。
—A number of safety-and security-critical applications such as asset tracking, smart ecosystems, autonomous vehicles and driver assistance functions, etc., are expected to benefit from the position information available through 5G. Driven by the aim to support such a wide-array of location-aware services and applications, the current release of 5G seeks to explore ranging and positioning [1] as an integral part of 5G technology. In recent years, many attacks on positioning and ranging systems have been demonstrated, and hence it is important to build 5G systems that are resilient to distance and location manipulation attacks. No existing proposal either by 3GPP or the research community addresses the challenges of secure position estimation in 5G. In this paper, we develop V-Range, the first secure ranging system that is fully compatible with 5G standards and can be implemented directly on top of existing 5G-NR transceivers. We design V-Range, a system capable of executing secure ranging operations resilient to both distance enlargement and reduction attacks. We experimentally verify that V-Range achieves high precision, low-latency, and can operate in both the sub-6GHz and mm-wave bands intended for 5G. Our results show that an attacker cannot reduce or increase the distance by more than the imprecision of the system, without being detected with high probability.