Dynamic Auction for Efficient Competitive Equilibrium under Price Rigidities
Dynamic Auction for Efficient Competitive Equilibrium under Price Rigidities
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-25832-9_82
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发表时间：
2011-12
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Junwu Zhu;Dongmo Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Junwu Zhu;Dongmo Zhang
在一个拍卖市场中，每一个出售物品的价格都被限制在一个允许的区间（价格刚性），瓦尔拉斯均衡通常不存在。Dreze（1975）引入了一个基于配给制度的瓦尔拉斯均衡的变体概念，称为约束瓦尔拉斯均衡，用于建模具有价格刚性的经济。Talman和Yang（2008）进一步完善了这一概念，并提出了一个收敛于约束瓦尔拉斯均衡的动态拍卖程序。然而，受约束的瓦尔拉斯均衡并不能保证市场效率。换句话说，受约束的瓦尔拉斯均衡配置不一定会导致最佳市场价值。在本文中，我们引入了竞争均衡的概念，通过削弱的概念，约束瓦尔拉斯均衡，并设计了一个动态拍卖程序，产生一个有效的竞争均衡。
In an auction market where the price of each selling item is restricted to an admissible interval (price rigidities), a Walrasian equilibrium usually fails to exist. Dreze (1975) introduced a variant concept of Walrasian equilibrium based on rationing systems, named constrained Walrasian equilibrium, for modelling an economy with price rigidities. Talman and Yang (2008) further refined the concept and proposed a dynamic auction procedure that converges to a constrained Walrasian equilibrium. However, a constrained Walrasian equilibrium does not guarantee market efficiency. In other words, a constrained Walrasian equilibrium allocation does not necessarily lead to the best market value. In this paper, we introduce a concept of competitive equilibrium by weakening the concept of constrained Walrasian equilibrium and devise an dynamic auction procedure that generates an efficient competitive equilibrium.