Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War, by Peter Jackson
Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War, by Peter Jackson
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超越均势：第一次世界大战时期的法国与国家安全政治，作者：彼得·杰克逊
DOI：
10.1093/ehr/cev102
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Keiger J
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作者：
Keiger J
通过两种相互竞争、经常重叠的法国安全概念的棱镜，他将其描述为“传统主义”和“国际主义”：前者围绕着基于力量平衡、联盟政治和物质力量的政策框架；后者强调各国在以国际机构为基础的国际法制度下的和平合作。杰克逊教授通过千变万化的档案、私人文件、当代期刊和最新的二手资料，非常有效地展示了“国际主义”对法国安全的态度是如何在第一次世界大战结束时逐渐获得知识力量、连贯性和适用性的，从而在20世纪20年代后期成为法国外交政策制定和外交的主导潮流。杰克逊将他的两条路线的交叉点定位于1924年至1926年左翼卡特尔政府时期。他在整本书中正确地强调，这些年法国外交和安全政策的主要目标是德国（实际上从1870年到现在都是如此）。因此，无论是“传统主义者”还是“国际主义者”，法国的目标都是控制德国的力量；前者通过组织欧洲平衡对抗德国，后者通过根据国际法将德国卷入国家间合作以削弱其实力，就像法国在二战后利用欧洲一体化一样。这本书没有完全揭示的是，“传统主义”和“国际主义”的方法，特别是德国的和解或英国的讨好，在政策制定精英中甚至在某些个人中共存的程度；由于偶然的原因，一种趋势在不同的时刻使另一种趋势黯然失色，在法国寻求应对德国力量的方式上产生了所谓的“交流流”。外交部长布里昂德和奥赛宫的高级官员菲利普·贝特洛就是这种矛盾心理的例子，1922年至1944年期间，总理兼外交部长雷蒙德·庞加莱也是这样，他在某些问题上通过传统的权力政治来约束德国，而在其他问题上通过商业协议来安抚德国之间摇摆不定。因此，在如何与德国打交道的问题上，个别个人的想法和政策在约束或和解方面摇摆不定；同样，在制度层面，比如奥赛码头（Quai d’orsay），从1870年至今，德国长期以来的政策摇摆不定，形成了不同的约束或和解模式。如果这本书仅仅局限于描绘1914年至1925年期间法国安全政策的传统主义和国际主义趋势，那么它将是对这一时期国际历史的一个非常好的贡献。但它的第二个主要维度涉及法国外交决策的文化、心态和官僚政治。在该领域早期研究的基础上，它着眼于法国外交部走廊里的个别常驻官员，以及他们的“潜规则”和知识环境是如何受到他们的社会和教育背景以及他们在École政治科学自由学院和巴黎法学院等机构的培训的影响的。同样，它非常清楚地追溯了法国外交决策中军事和议会成分的文化环境。这样，我们就看到了军事指挥在外交政策制定中的知识分子地位的迷人图景
BOOK REVIEWS most imaginatively and innovatively through the prism of two competing, often overlapping, conceptions of French security, which he describes as the ‘traditionalist’and ‘internationalist’strands: the former framed around policy based on the balance-of-power, alliance politics and material power; the latter with an emphasis on the peaceful co-operation of states under a regime of international law underpinned by international institutions. Professor Jackson demonstrates very effectively, through a kaleidoscope of archives, private papers, contemporary journals and the most up-to-date secondary sources, how the ‘internationalist’approach to French security gradually gained intellectual strength, coherence and applicability towards the end of the Great War—so as to become, by the later 1920s, the dominant current in French foreign-policy-making and diplomacy. Jackson situates the cross-over point of his two strands at the time of the left-wing Cartel governments from 1924 to 1926. He rightly stresses, throughout the book, that the principal object of France’s foreign and security policy during these years was Germany (as indeed it was from 1870 to the present). Thus, whether ‘traditionalist’or ‘internationalist’, France’s aim was to manage German power; in the former case by organising the European balance against Germany and in the latter by enmeshing Germany in inter-state co-operation under international law to emasculate her, just as France would use European integration after the Second World War. What does not emerge fully from the book is the extent to which the ‘traditionalist’and ‘internationalist’approaches, notably conciliation of Germany or the courting of Britain, co-existed in the policymaking elites and even within certain individuals; the one tendency eclipsing the other at various moments for contingent reasons, to produce what might be termed ‘alternating currents’ in the way France sought to deal with German power. The individual examples of Foreign Minister Briand and senior Quai d’Orsay permanent official Philippe Berthelot could be seen as examples of this ambivalence, as, to a lesser extent, could the Premier and Foreign Minister Raymond Poincaré in the years 1922–4, when he wavered between a policy of constraining Germany through traditional power politics on certain issues and conciliating her through commercial agreements on others. Thus, particular individuals’ ideas and policies fluctuated on how to deal with Germany in terms of constraint or conciliation; similarly, at the institutional level of, for instance, the Quai d’Orsay, policies over the longer term oscillated to create distinct patterns of constraint or conciliation of Germany from 1870 to the present.If the book were merely limited to drawing out the traditionalist and internationalist trends of French security policy from 1914 to 1925, it would be a very fine contribution to the international history of the period. But its second major dimension concerns the culture, mentality and bureaucratic politics of French foreign policy-making. Building on earlier research in this area, it looks at the individual permanent officials who populated the corridors of the French foreign ministry, and at how their their ‘unspoken assumptions’ and intellectual environment were conditioned by their social and educational background and their training at institutions such as the École Libre des Sciences Politiques and the Paris Faculty of Law. Similarly, it traces very clearly the cultural environment of the military and parliamentary ingredients in French foreign policy-making. Thus we are given a fascinating picture of the intellectual position of the military command in foreign-policy-making