Input price discrimination with passive partial ownership
Input price discrimination with passive partial ownership
复制标题
被动部分所有权的投入价格歧视
DOI：
10.1080/13504851.2021.1884831
复制
发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
and Junghyun Song
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Qing Hu;Tomomichi Mizuno;and Junghyun Song
被动部分所有权（PPO）在许多行业中普遍存在。当持股企业营业利润下降时，持股企业会增加产量，以减少通过持股企业股票获得的资本收益。在一个有下游PPO的纵向相关市场中，允许投入价格歧视时的消费者剩余和总剩余可能大于禁止投入价格歧视时的剩余，因为PPO减轻了因投入价格上涨而导致的产出减少的影响。
Passive partial ownership (PPO) is commonly practised in many industries. When operating profits of stock-owned firms decrease, stock-holding firms will increase output to reduce capital gain through owned firms’ stocks. In a vertically related market with downstream PPO, consumer and total surpluses when input price discrimination is allowed may be larger than when it is banned because PPO mitigates effects of reduction in output caused by higher input price.