Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy
Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy
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认知障碍及其对道德哲学的挑战
DOI：
10.1002/9781444322781.ch14
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Francis L
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Francis L
自由主义欢迎善的实质观念的多样性，但不欢迎这些观念的形成过程。关于善的想法是基于这样一种假设，即每个人都是自己的，独立形成。但人们的概念化能力各不相同。有些人，恰如其分地被描述为大脑，精通并深刻地参与了概念化。其他被标记为认知障碍的人，从有轻微限制的人到那些无法表达自己的人，以至于我们根本不能确定他们的行为是否受到概念的影响。受限的认知能力被认为阻碍了参与形成个性化的善的想法的规定过程。因此，自由主义理论在制定正义的原则和实践时，往往忽视了认知障碍者的观点。我们抛开形而上学驱动的关于人格的概念，展示“假体”思维(不同于代孕)的人际过程如何满足自由主义的标准，将认知残疾的人定位为完全参与正义的主体。
Liberalism welcomes diversity in substantive ideas of the good but not in the process whereby these ideas are formed. Ideas of the good acquire weight on the presumption that each is a person's own, formed independently. But people differ in their capacities to conceptualize. Some, appropriately characterized as cerebral, are proficient in and profoundly involved with conceptualizing. Others, labeled cognitively disabled, range from individuals with mild limitations to those so unable to express themselves that we cannot be sure whether their behavior is mediated by concepts at all. Constricted cognitive capacities have been thought to prevent participation in the prescribed process for forming personalized ideas of the good. So liberal theory, when formulating principles and practices of justice, often disregards cognitively disabled peoples' perspectives. We put aside metaphysically driven notions about personhood and show how interpersonal processes of “prosthetic” thinking (different from surrogacy) can satisfy liberalism's standards, positioning cognitively disabled individuals as fully participating subjects of justice.