On anthropological knowledge
On anthropological knowledge
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DOI：
10.1017/s0964028204000849
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发表时间：
2005-02-01
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Descola, Philippe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Descola, Philippe
随着人类学向新的对象扩展，其边界的定义变得如此模糊，以至于对其统一性提出了质疑。方法而不是内容为各种人类学家提供了可能的共同点，只要它是指他们真正做的事情，而不是他们说他们做的事情。在讨论进入他们的共同实践（描述，理解和解释）的三个操作中，有人认为，人类学与其说是一种满足严格认识论要求的特定方法，不如说是建立在主体间性普遍运作基础上的某种知识风格。
With the expansion of anthropology to new objects, the definition of its boundaries has become so fuzzy as to warrant questions about its unity. Method rather than content offers possible common ground to various breeds of anthropologist, provided that it is taken to mean what they really do rather than what they say they do. In discussing three operations that enter into their common practice (description, comprehension and explanation), it is argued that anthropology amounts less to a specific method answering to strict epistemological requirements than to a certain style of knowledge building on the universal workings of intersubjectivity.