Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence
Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence
复制标题
类比、道德直觉和专业知识防御
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Regina A. Rini
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Regina A. Rini
道德直觉的证据价值受到心理学研究的挑战，这些研究表明普通人的直觉受到扭曲因素的影响。对这一挑战的一种回应，即专门知识辩护，声称哲学思维的训练增强了专业哲学家直觉的可靠性。这种辩护通常通过类比来表达：既然我们不允许对数学或物理等领域的民间判断的怀疑破坏这些领域专家判断的可验证性，我们也不应该在哲学中这样做。在本文中，我澄清了类比策略的逻辑，并针对Jesper Ryberg最近的挑战进行了辩护。讨论暴露了一个有趣的分歧：虽然Ryberg的挑战可能会削弱道德和数学等领域之间的类比，但它们不会影响其他领域的类比，如物理学。我的结论是，专家辩护可以通过类比的方式来支持，尽管在选择适当的类比时需要谨慎。我讨论了这一结论的专业知识辩护辩论和研究的道德领域本身的影响。
The evidential value of moral intuitions has been challenged by psychological work showing that the intuitions of ordinary people are affected by distorting factors. One reply to this challenge, the expertise defence, claims that training in philosophical thinking confers enhanced reliability on the intuitions of professional philosophers. This defence is often expressed through analogy: since we do not allow doubts about folk judgments in domains like mathematics or physics to undermine the plausibility of judgments by experts in these domains, we also should not do so in philosophy. In this paper I clarify the logic of the analogy strategy, and defend it against recent challenges by Jesper Ryberg. The discussion exposes an interesting divide: while Ryberg’s challenges may weaken analogies between morality and domains like mathematics, they do not affect analogies to other domains, such as physics. I conclude that the expertise defence can be supported by analogical means, though care is required in selecting an appropriate analog. I discuss implications of this conclusion for the expertise defence debate and for study of the moral domain itself.