On Quota Violations of OPEC Members
On Quota Violations of OPEC Members
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关于欧佩克成员国配额违规问题
DOI：
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Rastad
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hamed Ghoddusi;M. Nili;M. Rastad
在过去几十年里，违反配额已成为欧佩克成员国的常态。然而，关于欧佩克的学术文献更多地关注其生产行为，而不是分析配额分配过程或配额违反模式的特征。本文提出了一个具有实证证据的理论模型来解释欧佩克成员国遵守或违反配额的动机。首先提出了一个卡特尔模型，该模型具有配额分配规则和内生容量选择。该模型强调了在建设闲置产能以争取更高的合法配额与冒着违反配额被惩罚的风险之间的权衡。利用1995 - 2007年的季度数据，实证支持了模型的主要结论和直觉。我们的经验证据与一个理论框架是一致的，在这个理论框架中，产能限制在经济繁荣时期是一种执行机制，而欧佩克的配额制度在经济低迷时期是对其成员国的约束。
Over the last decades quota violations have become a norm for OPEC countries. However, the academic literature on OPEC focuses more on its production behavior than on analyzing the quota allocation process or characterizing quota violation patterns. This paper offers a theoretical model with empirical evidence to explain OPEC members' incentives for abiding or violating quotas. We first offer a cartel model with a quota allocation rule and an endogenous capacity choice. The model highlights the trade-off between building spare capacity to bargain for a higher legitimate quota versus risking quota violation punishment. Using the quarterly data from 1995 to 2007, we empirically support the main results and intuitions for the model. Our empirical evidence is consistent with a theoretical framing in which capacity constraints work as an enforcement mechanism in good times and OPEC's quota system disciplining its members in bad times.