On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy
On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3752481
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发表时间：
2020-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Chatterji;Jordi Massó;Shigehiro Serizawa
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文献类型：
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作者：
S. Chatterji;Jordi Massó;Shigehiro Serizawa
我们认为，在一个丰富的域的偏好配置文件的设置，多个私人物品被分配给一组代理人的权利，偏好显示饱和的策略证明规则。我们表明，如果该规则是另外的“可取的”，因为它是tops-only，连续的，同侧和个人理性的权利，那么在域中的偏好必须满足一个变种的单峰性（称为半格单峰性）。我们还提供了一个匡威的主要发现。事实证明，这一领域与公共产品的一般设置中已经确定的领域相吻合。最后，我们将半格单峰域与已知的限制域相关联，在这些限制域下确实存在策略证明和理想规则。
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition "desirable", in that it is tops-only, continuous, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with a public good. Finally, we relate semilattice single-peaked domains to well-known restricted domains under which strategy-proof and desirable rules do exist.