The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations
The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations
复制标题
战争授权给叛乱组织
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Idean Salehyan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Idean Salehyan
处于国际争端中的国家有时会选择用自己的军事力量攻击敌人，但有时会选择赋予国内叛乱团体权力。如何解释通过叛军代理人而不是直接与对手交战的决定？国际冲突的理论和经验分析都采取了以国家为中心的偏见，忽视了直接使用武力和通过叛乱组织采取间接行动之间的替代。本说明通过委托代理理论的透镜审查了将冲突委托给叛乱分子的决定。虽然国家支持反叛组织放弃冲突的一些代价，但它们也失去了一定程度的外交政策自主权。冲突授权的初步证据，沿着一些经验检验的命题。最后，从叛军的角度来看，授权的后果进行了探讨。这个框架作为一个起点，为未来的研究反叛赞助人的互动。
States in an international dispute sometimes choose to attack their enemies with their own military forces but other times choose to empower domestic insurgent groups. What explains the decision to act through rebel proxies rather than directly engage a rival? Theories and empirical analyses of international conflict have adopted a state-centric bias, ignoring the substitution between direct uses of force and indirect action through rebel organizations. This note examines the decision to delegate conflict to rebels through the lens of principal—agent theory. While states support rebel groups to forgo some of the costs of conflict, they also lose a degree of foreign policy autonomy. Preliminary evidence of conflict delegation is presented, along with a number of empirically testable propositions. Finally, the consequences of delegation from the rebels’ perspective are explored. This framework serves as a starting point for future research on rebel—patron interactions.