Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
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DOI：
10.1007/s00355-020-01292-w
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发表时间：
2020-10
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Hitoshi Matsushima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hitoshi Matsushima
本研究探讨了一个社会选择函数在事后项迭代优势中的独特实现。我们假设部分事后可验证；也就是说，在确定分配之后，中央计划者可以观察到关于状态的部分信息是可验证的。我们展示了状态空间的一个条件，称为“完全检测”，并表明在完全检测的情况下，任何社会选择函数都是唯一可实现的，即使事后可以验证的信息非常有限。为了证明这一点，我们构建了一个动态机制，根据该机制，每个参与者在早期阶段在其他参与者观察到该信号之前宣布他（或她）的私有信号，并且每个参与者在后期阶段也宣布状态。在这种结构中，我们可以施加一些严格的限制，如有界性，只允许少量转移离开均衡路径，以及不允许转移到均衡路径上。本研究没有假设预期效用或拟线性。
This study investigates the unique implementation of a social choice function in iterative dominance in the ex-post term. We assume partial ex-post verifiability; that is, after determining an allocation, the central planner can observe partial information about the state as verifiable. We demonstrate a condition of the state space, termed “full detection,” and show that with full detection, any social choice function is uniquely implementable even if the information that can be verified ex-post is very limited. To prove this, we construct a dynamic mechanism according to which each player announces his (or her) private signal, before the other players observe this signal, at an earlier stage, and each player also announces the state at a later stage. In this construction, we can impose several severe restrictions such as boundedness, permission of only tiny transfers off the equilibrium path, and no permission of transfers on the equilibrium path. This study does not assume either expected utility or quasi-linearity.