I. INTRODUCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
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DOI:
10.1080/02681307.2012.746022
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发表时间:
2012-12
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Shashank V. Joshi
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Shashank V. Joshi
Six years ago, in mid-2006, Iran had no centrifuges spinning and possessed no enriched uranium. Robert Joseph, the US under secretary of state for arms control, declared that year: ‘we cannot have a single centrifuge spinning in Iran. Iran is a direct threat to the national security of the United States and our allies’. Today, as President Barack Obama prepares to begin his second term, Iran has installed over 9,000 centrifuges, and has produced 6,876 kg of uranium enriched to 3.5 per cent, known as low-enriched uranium (LEU). By the end of 2012, Iran could easily have enriched enough uranium to 20 per cent (still LEU, but described here as medium-enriched uranium, or ‘MEU’, for clarity) to suffice for one nuclear bomb, if that were enriched further to weapons-grade. Iran instead chose to convert much of its MEU stockpile into reactor fuel, but it is not clear whether it will continue to do so. The quickening pace of Iran’s nuclear activities, and its growing degree of ‘nuclear latency’ a state’s temporal and technical proximity to acquiring a usable nuclear device has produced a sense of urgency amongst a number of countries, including Arab rivals of Iran. Iran’s dogged pursuit of nuclear technology in the face of unprecedented pressure has also placed new stresses on the Iranian state itself. Indeed, a former senior Iranian diplomat, Seyed Hossein Mousavian, observes in his recently released memoirs that ‘the nuclear crisis has been the most important challenge facing the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy apparatus since the 1980 88 war between Iran and Iraq’.