The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods
The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods
复制标题
溢出效应对地方公共产品供给的影响
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Unal Zenginobuz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Francis Bloch;Unal Zenginobuz
本文分析了具有跨司法管辖区正溢出效应的地方公共产品的提供。如果溢出是对称的，那么司法管辖区之间的非合作博弈就会形成唯一的均衡，而溢出效应的增加则会减少公共产品的总供给。较小的司法管辖区总是减少他们的贡献，但较大的司法管辖区可以增加他们的贡献。当溢出是不对称的时，当溢出较低时，均衡是唯一的，而当溢出较高时，存在多个均衡。在两个法域的情况下，溢出到一个法域的增加有利于来自该法域的代理人，但损害另一个法域的代理人。除了两个司法管辖区的情况外，溢出效应的变化的影响是不能签署的。流入某一法域的溢出效应的增加实际上可能导致该法域和居住在该法域的损害行为者增加公共产品的供应，同时使其他法域的行为者受益。这篇论文的结果揭示了相互作用的复杂性，这些相互作用将困扰具有溢出效应的多司法管辖区地方公共产品经济的制度设计。
This paper analyzes the provision of local public goods with positive spillovers across jurisdictions. If spillovers are symmetric, the non-cooperative game played by jurisdictions admits a unique equilibrium, and an increase in spillovers reduces the total provision of public goods. Smaller jurisdictions always reduce their contribution, but larger jurisdictions can increase their contribution. When spillovers are asymmetric, equilibrium is unique if spillovers are low, while multiple equilibria exist for high spillover values. In the case of two jurisdictions, an increase in the flow of spillovers to one jurisdiction benefits agents from that jurisdiction but harms agents in the other jurisdiction. Beyond the case of two jurisdictions, the effect of changes in spillovers cannot be signed. An increase in the spillovers flowing to a jurisdiction can actually result in an increase in the supply of public goods by that jurisdiction and harm agents residing in it, while benefiting agents in the other jurisdictions. The results of the paper reveal the complexity of interactions that will plague the design of institutions for multijurisdictional local public good economies with spillovers.