Evolutionary Game Dynamics in a Fitness-Dependent Wright—Fisher Process with Noise
Evolutionary Game Dynamics in a Fitness-Dependent Wright—Fisher Process with Noise
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DOI：
10.1088/0253-6102/56/3/02
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发表时间：
2011-09
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Quan Ji;Xianjia Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Quan Ji;Xianjia Wang
有限规模种群中的演化博弈动力学可以用适应度依赖的Wright-Fisher过程来描述。我们考虑混合种群中的对称2×2游戏。在模型中，引入了两个参数来描述玩家的理性水平和环境中的噪声强度。与无噪声情况下的固定概率方法不同，噪声强度参数的引入使该过程成为一个遍历马尔可夫过程，基于该过程的极限分布，可以分析博弈的进化稳定策略。我们使用囚徒困境游戏（PDG）和雪堆游戏（SG）来说明这两个参数对游戏ESS的影响。我们还将我们模型的ESS与无限规模种群中的复制因子动态进行了比较。通过仿真实验确定了结果。
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite size populations can be described by a fitness-dependent Wright-Fisher process. We consider symmetric 2×2 games in a well-mixed population. In our model, two parameters to describe the level of player's rationality and noise intensity in environment are introduced. In contrast with the fixation probability method that used in a noiseless case, the introducing of the noise intensity parameter makes the process an ergodic Markov process and based on the limit distribution of the process, we can analysis the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the games. We illustrate the effects of the two parameters on the ESS of games using the Prisoner's dilemma games (PDG) and the snowdrift games (SG). We also compare the ESS of our model with that of the replicator dynamics in infinite size populations. The results are determined by simulation experiments.