Joint vs. Individual Taxation and Intrafamily Distribution
Joint vs. Individual Taxation and Intrafamily Distribution
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联合与个人税收和家庭内部分配
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Peter M. Mieszkowski
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Gugl;J. Brown;Suchan Chae;Peter M. Mieszkowski
Apps and Rees（1999 a and B）从效率的角度和家庭间分配的角度评价了从夫妻个人税制向夫妻共同税制的转变，而本文则考虑了这种税制改革对家庭内分配的影响。纳税时间表的变化要么扩大要么缩小了夫妇的效用可能性集（UPS）。我们考虑了相似和对称的UPF，并假设丈夫的工资率高于妻子。我们以两种方式为配偶分享家庭资源建模。(1)夫妻双方采用一种讨价还价规则，即纳什讨价还价或Kalai-Smorodinsky解决方案，其中分歧点是每个配偶单身时的效用;（2）夫妻双方分配家庭全部收入，市场商品和家庭商品的分配是竞争性的。UPS的扩大（减少）并不一定意味着配偶双方都因税收改革而变得更好（更差）。(1)在谈判的方式下，家庭税收改革不会影响分歧点，如果UPS扩大，配偶双方都从税收改革中受益。(2)在竞争性办法下，如果配偶获得的家庭资源与他们对家庭全部收入的贡献成比例，丈夫从税收改革中受益，而妻子则受到税收改革的伤害。如果单独征税比共同征税导致更大的不平等，那么在这两种方法下，单独征税比共同征税导致配偶之间更低的不平等。1 JEL代码：C71、D13、D 63、H24、H31。
Apps and Rees (1999 a and b) evaluate a change from individual to joint taxation for couples on efficiency grounds and from an interhousehold distributional perspective, while this paper considers intrafamily distributional effects of such a tax reform. The change in tax schedule either expands or shrinks the utility possibility set (UPS) of a couple. Homothetic and symmetric UPF’s are considered and we assume that the husband earns a higher wage rate than the wife. We model how spouses share family resources in two ways. (1) Spouses apply a bargaining rule, namely the Nash Bargaining or the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, where the disagreement point is the utility of each spouse when single; (2) Spouses divide family full income between them and the allocation of the market good and the household good is competitive. An expansion (reduction) of the UPS does not necessarily imply that both spouses are better off (worse off) with tax reform. (1) Under the bargaining approach, a family tax reform will not affect the disagreement point and both spouses benefit from tax reform if the UPS expands. (2) Under the competitive approach, if spouses receive family resources proportional to their contribution to family full income, the husband benefits from tax reform and the wife is hurt by tax reform. If individual taxation results in a larger UPS than joint taxation, then under both approaches individual taxation leads to lower inequality between spouses than joint taxation. 1 JEL-Codes: C71, D13, D63, H24, H31.