Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips
Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips
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财政规则作为讨价还价的筹码
DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdaa080
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Alessandro Riboni
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Piguillem;Alessandro Riboni
大多数财政规则都可以通过共识来推翻。我们表明，这并不使他们无效。由于财政规则决定了在出现分歧的情况下的外部选择，反对派将其作为“讨价还价的筹码”，以获得支出让步。我们表明，在某些条件下，这种政治交易减轻了债务积累问题。我们分析了各种规则，发现当政治极化程度高时，严厉的财政规则（如政府关门）最大限度地提高了反对派的讨价还价能力，并导致债务积累降低。当两极分化程度较低时，较不严格的财政限制（例如平衡预算规则）是可取的。此外，我们发现，最优的财政规则可以通过谈判在均衡中产生。最后，通过防止权力波动，可谈判规则比硬性规则产生更高的福利。
Most fiscal rules can be overridden by consensus. We show that this does not make them ineffectual. Since fiscal rules determine the outside option in case of disagreement, the opposition uses them as “bargaining chips” to obtain spending concessions. We show that under some conditions this political bargain mitigates the debt-accumulation problem. We analyse various rules and find that when political polarization is high, harsh fiscal rules (e.g. government shutdown) maximize the opposition’s bargaining power and lead to lower debt accumulation. When polarization is low, less strict fiscal limits (e.g. balanced-budget rule) are preferable. Moreover, we find that the optimal fiscal rules could arise in equilibrium by negotiation. Finally, by insuring against power fluctuations, negotiable rules yield higher welfare than hard ones.