Market-Based Emissions Regulation and Industry Dynamics
Market-Based Emissions Regulation and Industry Dynamics
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DOI：
10.1086/684484
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发表时间：
2016-02-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
Ryan, Stephen P.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fowlie, Meredith;Reguant, Mar;Ryan, Stephen P.
我们评估的静态和动态影响的替代市场为基础的政策，限制温室气体排放量在美国水泥行业。我们的研究结果突出了两个抵消市场扭曲。首先，排放管制加剧了国内水泥市场中与行使市场支配力有关的扭曲。第二，受贸易影响的市场的排放“渗漏”抵消了国内的排放减少。这些力量加在一起，在完全将排放外部性内在化的政策制度下，可能导致社会福利损失。以市场为基础的政策，包括设计特点，以减轻市场力量的行使和排放泄漏提供福利收益时，碳排放的损害是高的。
We assess the static and dynamic implications of alternative market-based policies limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the US cement industry. Our results highlight two countervailing market distortions. First, emissions regulation exacerbates distortions associated with the exercise of market power in the domestic cement market. Second, emissions "leakage" in trade-exposed markets offsets domestic emissions reductions. Taken together, these forces can result in social welfare losses under policy regimes that fully internalize the emissions externality. Market-based policies that incorporate design features to mitigate the exercise of market power and emissions leakage deliver welfare gains when damages from carbon emissions are high.