A Lightweight Masked AES Implementation for Securing IoT Against CPA Attacks
A Lightweight Masked AES Implementation for Securing IoT Against CPA Attacks
复制标题
DOI：
10.1109/tcsi.2017.2702098
复制
发表时间：
2017-11-01
影响因子：
5.1
通讯作者：
Kose, Selcuk
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yu, Weize;Kose, Selcuk
提出了一种基于伪密钥的高级加密标准（AES）技术，以防止在相关功耗分析（CPA）攻击下存储的密钥从替换盒中泄漏，而无需显著的功耗和面积开销。在重构阶段期间利用基于波动微分逻辑（WEDR）的XOR门来隐藏可能与假密钥高度相关的中间数据。在应用假密钥并使用WESTERN设计重构阶段后，所提出的轻量级掩码AES引擎实现的最小测量公开值在CPA攻击下超过1.5亿。与未受保护的AES引擎相比，所提出的AES实现的功率、面积和性能开销可以忽略不计。
A false key-based advanced encryption standard (AES) technique is proposed to prevent the stored secret key leaking from the substitution-box under correlation power analysis (CPA) attacks without significant power and area overhead. Wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL)-based XOR gates are utilized during the reconstruction stage to hide the intermediate data that may be highly correlated with the false key. After applying the false key and designing the reconstruction stage with the WDDL, the minimum measurement-to-disclose value for the proposed lightweight masked AES engine implementation becomes over 150 million against CPA attacks. As compared to an unprotected AES engine, the power, area, and performance overhead of the proposed AES implementation is negligible.