Inspection Games
Inspection Games
复制标题
检查游戏
DOI：
10.1007/978-0-387-30440-3_287
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
M. Canty
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Avenhaus;M. Canty
从六十年代对军控和裁军问题的分析开始，视察博弈已经发展成为博弈论的一个特殊领域，具有特定的理论方面，并且同样重要的是在强制视察的人类活动的各个领域中的实际应用。在本文中，首先对应用程序进行了调查。然后，在博弈论框架中提出一般检查问题作为统计假设检验问题的扩展。使用这个框架，解决了两个重要的模型：物料核算和数据验证。检查游戏的第二个重要方面是必须战略性地使用有限的检查资源。这是在顺序检查游戏的背景下提出的，其中研究了许多具有数学挑战性的模型。最后，领导力的重要概念，即检查员通过宣布并致力于其策略而成为领导者，被证明可以自然地应用于检查游戏。
Starting with the analysis of arms control and disarmament problems in the sixties, inspection games have evolved into a special area of game theory with specific theoretical aspects, and, equally important, practical applications in various fields of human activities where inspection is mandatory. In this contribution, a survey of applications is given first. Then, the general problem of inspection is presented in a game theoretic framework as an extension of a statistical hypothesis testing problem. Using this framework, two important models are solved: material accountancy and data verification. A second important aspect of inspection games are limited inspection resources that have to be used strategically. This is presented in the context of sequential inspection games, where many mathematically challenging models have been studied. Finally, the important concept of leadership, where the inspector becomes a leader by announcing and committing himself to his strategy, is shown to apply naturally to inspection games.