On optimality in intergenerational risk sharing
On optimality in intergenerational risk sharing
复制标题
论代际风险分担的最优性
DOI：
10.1007/s001990100199
复制
发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
G. Demange
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Demange
总结。本文定义并研究了具有有限生存主体的动态随机经济中的最优性，并研究了有或没有序列完备市场的均衡的最优性。考虑了各种帕累托最优概念，包括中期最优性和事前最优性。我们证明，在拥有生产性资产(土地)并按顺序完善市场的均衡状态下，政府的干预可能是正当的，但只是为了改善几代人之间的风险分担。如果市场是不完全的，则研究两期生存的OLG经济体中的约束临时最优性。我们推广了土地均衡的最优性性质，并给出了在均衡时引入现收现付制不会导致任何帕累托改进的条件。
Summary. This paper defines and studies optimality in a dynamic stochastic economy with finitely lived agents, and investigates the optimality properties of an equilibrium with or without sequentially complete markets. Various Pareto optimality concepts are considered, including interim and ex ante optimality. We show that, at an equilibrium with a productive asset (land) and sequentially complete markets, the intervention of a government may be justified, but only to improve risk sharing between generations. If markets are incomplete, constrained interim optimality is investigated in two-period lived OLG economies. We extend the optimality properties of an equilibrium with land and give conditions under which introducing a pay-as-you-go system at an equilibrium would not lead to any Pareto improvement.