Structural Estimation of the Scoring Auction Model
Structural Estimation of the Scoring Auction Model
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发表时间：
2016-02
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通讯作者：
Jun Nakabayashi;Yohsuke Hirose
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作者：
Jun Nakabayashi;Yohsuke Hirose
本文提供了一个分析框架的评分拍卖。我们首先刻画了一个对称单调均衡的评分拍卖。然后，我们提出了一个半参数的程序来确定联合分布的投标人的多维信号从评分拍卖数据。我们的方法允许在具有多维信号的设置中使用广泛的评分规则。最后，利用我们的分析框架，我们进行了一个实证实验，估计拍卖形式和评分规则的变化的影响。评分拍卖的数据来自日本建设项目的公共采购拍卖。
This paper offers an analytical framework for the scoring auction. We first characterize a symmetric monotone equilibrium in the scoring auction. We then propose a semiparametric procedure to identify the joint distribution of the bidder's multidimensional signal from scoring auction data. Our approach allows for a broad class of scoring rules in settings with multidimensional signals. Finally, using our analytical framework, we conduct an empirical experiment to estimate the impacts of the change of auction formats and scoring rules. The data on scoring auctions are from public procurement auctions for construction projects in Japan.