Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879-1929
Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879-1929
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进入和掠夺：英国航运卡特尔 1879-1929
DOI：
10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00679.x
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发表时间：
1997
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
F. Morton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Morton
我研究了商船公司在世纪之交进入成熟市场的案例的结果。这些成熟的市场完全被由几家航运公司成员组成的卡特尔垄断。卡特尔决定是否对进入者发动价格战；一些进入者在没有任何冲突的情况下被正式接纳为卡特尔成员。我使用进入者的特征来预测进入者是否会遇到有条件的价格战。我发现较弱的进入者会受到竞争，而较弱意味着更少的金融资源、经验、规模或糟糕的贸易条件。实证结果支持了“长钱包”捕食理论。我讨论了支持实证结果的定性证据，如卡特尔成员之间通信中表达的掠夺性意图。结果还发现对因变量的错误分类具有鲁棒性，这是处理历史数据时特别关注的问题。
I examine the outcomes of cases of entry by merchant shipping lines into established markets around the turn of the century. These established markets are completely dominated by an incumbent cartel composed of several member shipping lines. The cartel makes the decision whether or not to begin a price war against the entrant; some entrants are formally admitted to the cartel without any conflict. I use characteristics of the entrant to predict whether or not the entrant will encounter a price war conditional on entering. I find that weaker entrants are fought, where weaker means less financial resources, experience, size, or poor trade conditions. The empirical results provide support for the long purse theory of predation. I discuss qualitative evidence such as predatory intent expressed in correspondence between cartel members which supports the empirical results. The results are also found to be robust to misclassification of the dependent variable which is a particular concern when dealing with historical data.