Could a Website Really Have Doomed the Health Exchanges? Multiple Equilibria, Initial Conditions and the Construction of the Fine
Could a Website Really Have Doomed the Health Exchanges? Multiple Equilibria, Initial Conditions and the Construction of the Fine
复制标题
一个网站真的会毁掉健康交流吗？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kent A. Smetters
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Florian Scheuer;Kent A. Smetters
公众的注意力集中在国家健康交易所的推出如何影响最初注册的风险类型，从而影响未来的保费和注册。我们引入简单的动态到一个标准模型的保险下的逆向选择，以表明这样的“初始条件”确实可以的问题。当企业是价格接受者时，如果至少有三个均衡，市场可以收敛到帕累托劣势的“坏”均衡，我们认为这是有实证支持的。战略定价消除了帕累托支配均衡，但需要偏好和风险分布的共同知识。将对非参与者的罚款从一个固定的数额改变为均衡价格的一小部分，增加了与达到“好”均衡相一致的初始条件的范围，同时减少了坏均衡的“坏”--所有这些都没有增加好均衡中的罚款价值。允许保险公司快速改变价格可以鼓励他们在市场基本面不完全清楚的情况下尝试战略定价，从而增加了独立于初始条件达到良好均衡的机会。
Public attention has focused on how the launch of the national health exchanges could impact the types of risks who initially enroll and thereby affect future premiums and enrollment. We introduce simple dynamics into a standard model of insurance under adverse selection to show that such "initial conditions" can indeed matter. When firms are price-takers, the market can converge to a Pareto-inferior "bad" equilibrium if there are at least three equilibria, which we suggest has empirical support. Strategic pricing eliminates Pareto dominated equilibria but requires common knowledge of preference and risk distributions. Changing the fine on non-participants from a fixed amount to a fraction of equilibrium prices increases the range of initial conditions consistent with reaching the "good" equilibrium while reducing the "badness" of the bad equilibrium -- all without increasing the fine value in the good equilibrium. Allowing insurers to quickly change prices can encourage them to experiment with strategic pricing if market fundamentals are not perfectly known, increasing the chance of reaching the good equilibrium independently from initial conditions.