Regulatory design and incentives for renewable energy
Regulatory design and incentives for renewable energy
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可再生能源的监管设计和激励措施
DOI：
10.1007/s11149-012-9188-1
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发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Jorge Barrera
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alfredo García;J. M. Alzate;Jorge Barrera
增加可再生能源的发电量是目前能源政策的主要目标之一。风能和太阳能等可再生能源的间歇性必然会对监管目标造成复杂的权衡，例如资源充足性（和系统可靠性）与减少绿色房屋气体排放。我们开发了一个高度程式化的投资模型，以获得有关增加可再生能源的监管激励措施的运作的见解。我们首先表明，激励措施确实是必要的，当有显着的规模经济的形式“边做边学”，或者，当有过剩的传统技术，由于传统的投资能力。我们分析了两种不同的监管计划（上网电价和可再生能源标准），旨在增加对可再生能源的投资。我们表明，这两种方案都不能诱导可再生能源投资的社会最优水平。单一的上网电价不能诱导最优投资，因为超过传统技术边际成本的上网电价会激励过度开发最有吸引力的网站，从而抢占对不太有吸引力但有社会价值的网站的投资。促进增加对可再生技术投资的可再生能源组合标准导致对传统技术投资不足。这些结果表明，“临床”监管设计，即促进适量的可再生能源发电量而不影响传统发电量，是一个具有挑战性的命题。
Increasing electric power production from renewable energy sources is currently one of the major objectives of energy policy. The intermittent nature of renewables, such as wind and solar, necessarily imposes complex trade-offs for regulatory objectives, such as resource adequacy (and system reliability) versus reductions in green house gas emissions. We develop a highly stylized model of investments in order to derive insights regarding the workings of regulatory incentives for increased renewable energy. We first show that incentives are indeed needed when there are significant economies of scale in the form of “learning by doing” or alternatively, when there is excess capacity in conventional technology due to legacy investments. We analyze two different regulatory schemes (feed-in tariffs and renewable portafolio standards) aimed at increasing investment in renewable capacity. We show that neither scheme is capable of inducing the socially optimal level of investment in renewable capacity. A single feed-in tariff fails to induce optimal investment as a feed-in tariff exceeding marginal costs of conventional technology incentivizes over-development of the most attractive sites which preempts investment in less attractive, yet socially valuable sites. A renewable portfolio standard that promotes increased investment in renewable technology induces under-investment in the conventional technology. These results suggest that a “clinical” regulatory design, that is, one that promotes the right amount of renewable capacity without affecting conventional capacity is a challenging proposition.