Antitrust, Agency and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations
Antitrust, Agency and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations
复制标题
反垄断、代理与特赦：针对企业的反垄断法刑事执法的经济学分析
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.305260
复制
发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Bruce H. Kobayashi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bruce H. Kobayashi
最近对大公司处以创纪录的罚款已被反垄断部门公开吹捧为成功的衡量标准。本文建议延长该政策时应谨慎行事。由于刑事罚款不是对损失的准确衡量，而且由于公司责任的替代性质，因此存在着巨大的危险，即高于最佳处罚将导致公司承担过高的成本，以试图避免这些高额罚款。反垄断部门扩大使用企业宽大处理政策，夸大了高于最佳罚款的潜在过度威慑成本。具有讽刺意味的是，过度威慑的成本将导致消费者的价格上涨、福利减少，并最终导致刑事反垄断法旨在防止的确切影响。
The recent imposition of record fines on large corporations has been publicly touted by the Antitrust Division as a measure of success. In this article, it is suggested that extension of this policy should be taken with some caution. Because criminal fines are not accurate measures of loss, and because of the vicarious nature of corporate liability, there is a great danger that higher-than-optimal penalties will induce corporations to incur excessive costs in an attempt to avoid these high fines. The potential overdeterrence costs resulting from higher-than-optimal fines is exaggerated by the Antitrust Division's expanded use of the Corporate Leniency Policy. Ironically, the costs of overdeterrence will result in higher prices to consumers, a decrease in welfare, and, ultimately, in the exact effects that the criminal antitrust laws are intended to prevent.