Game-theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis
Game-theoretic methods in general equilibrium analysis
复制标题
一般均衡分析中的博弈论方法
DOI：
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Sorin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Mertens;S. Sorin
图表列表。作者名单。介绍肯尼迪。莫顿。答：核心和讨价还价组。1 .一般均衡与合作对策：基本结果。2。完全竞争经济中的核心收敛。R.M.安德森。3。原子经济。莫顿。4 .讨价还价集R. Vohra。B：价值。V.沙普利值R.J.奥曼。具有连续玩家的游戏的价值7。TU值：不可微情况j - f。莫顿。附录：完全竞争市场的沙普利值可能不存在。8。哈萨尼价值。9。值等价定理：TU和NTU情况。沙普利值的经济应用。C：大型市场和游戏的合作方法。西。等价现象的公理化方法P. Dubey， A. Neyman。十二。大型游戏与有效小团体的经济。D：不合作的方式。十三。战略市场博弈：若干研究结果综述。十四。从纳什到瓦尔拉斯均衡E.艾伦，H. Polemarchakis。十五。关联和通信均衡[j]。莫顿。十六。相关平衡和太阳黑子平衡的注释[j]。第十七章。使用Plain Conversation实现S. Sorin。
List of Figures. List of Authors. Introduction J.-F. Mertens. A: The Core and the Bargaining Set. I. General Equilibrium and Cooperative Games: Basic Results E. Allen, S. Sorin. II. Core Convergence in Perfectly Competitive Economies R.M. Anderson. III. Economies with Atoms J.-F. Mertens. IV. Bargaining Sets R. Vohra. B: The Value. V. The Shapley Value R.J. Aumann. VI. Value of Games with a Continuum of Players A. Neyman. VII. The TU Value: the Non-Differentiable Case J.-F. Mertens. Addendum: The Shapley value of a perfectly competitive market may not exist F. Lefevre. VIII. The Harsanyi Value S. Hart. IX. Value Equivalence Theorems: the TU and NTU Cases S. Hart. X. Economic Applications of the Shapley Value R.J. Aumann. C: The Cooperative Approach to Large Markets and Games. XI. An Axiomatic Approach to the Equivalence Phenomenon P. Dubey, A. Neyman. XII. Large Games and Economies with Effective Small Groups M.H. Wooders. D: The Non-Cooperative Approach. XIII. Strategic Market Games: a Survey of Some Results P. Dubey. XIV. From Nash to Walras Equilibrium E. Allen, H. Polemarchakis. XV. Correlated and Communication Equilibria J.-F. Mertens. XVI. Notes on Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium J. Peck. XVII. Implementation with Plain Conversation S. Sorin.