Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
复制标题
确定性、主导策略组合拍卖中的收入单调性
DOI：
10.1016/j.artint.2010.08.005
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Kevin Leyton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Baharak Rastegari;A. Condon;Kevin Leyton
在使用VCG的组合拍卖中，卖家有时可以通过放弃竞标者来增加收入。在本文中，我们调查了在其他确定性的、主导策略的组合拍卖机制下，这种违反直觉的现象也会在多大程度上发生。我们的主要结果是，这种“收入单调性”的失败可能发生在任何这样的弱最大机制下--大致意味着它选择不能增加的分配，以导致落选的投标人在不损害中标人的情况下获胜--这允许投标人表达任意的已知单一偏好。我们还给出了一组其他不可能的结果作为推论，涉及到当商品集合改变时的收入，防假名，以及核心1
In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this counterintuitive phenomenon can also occur under other deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auction mechanisms. Our main result is that such failures of “revenue monotonicity” can occur under any such mechanism that is weakly maximal—meaning roughly that it chooses allocations that cannot be augmented to cause a losing bidder to win without hurting winning bidders—and that allows bidders to express arbitrary known single-minded preferences. We also give a set of other impossibility results as corollaries, concerning revenue when the set of goods changes, false-name-proofness, and the core.1