Smallholder farmers and contract farming in developing countries
Smallholder farmers and contract farming in developing countries
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.1909501116
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发表时间：
2020-01-07
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Bellemare, Marc F.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Meemken, Eva-Marie;Bellemare, Marc F.
许多发展中国家的小农场普遍存在贫穷现象。大量文献表明，合同农业-农民和购买者之间的收获前协议-可以促进小农市场参与，改善家庭福利，促进农村发展。这些发现影响了发展政策辩论，但现存证据的外部有效性有限。现有的研究通常侧重于单一的合同计划或一个国家的一个小的地理区域。我们使用来自6个国家的具有全国代表性的调查数据，生成了超出特定合同计划，作物或国家的可推广证据。我们关注订单农业对家庭收入和劳动力需求的影响，发现只有在一些国家，合同农民的收入高于没有合同的农民。大多数国家的合同农民对雇佣劳动力的需求增加，这表明合同农业刺激了就业，但我们没有发现社区层面溢出效应的证据。我们的研究结果挑战了合同农业明确改善福利的概念。我们讨论了为什么我们的结果可能会偏离以前的研究结果，并提出了研究设计，产生更大的内部和外部效度。对政策和研究的影响超出了合同农业的范围。
Poverty is prevalent in the small-farm sector of many developing countries. A large literature suggests that contract farming-a pre-harvest agreement between farmers and buyers-can facilitate smallholder market participation, improve household welfare, and promote rural development. These findings have influenced the development policy debate, but the external validity of the extant evidence is limited. Available studies typically focus on a single contract scheme or on a small geographical area in one country. We generate evidence that is generalizable beyond a particular contract scheme, crop, or country, using nationally representative survey data from 6 countries. We focus on the implications of contract farming for household income and labor demand, finding that contract farmers obtain higher incomes than their counterparts without contracts only in some countries. Contract farmers in most countries exhibit increased demand for hired labor, which suggests that contract farming stimulates employment, yet we do not find evidence of spillover effects at the community level. Our results challenge the notion that contract farming unambiguously improves welfare. We discuss why our results may diverge from previous findings and propose research designs that yield greater internal and external validity. Implications for policy and research are relevant beyond contract farming.