Book Review, Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan, by Pepper D. Culpepper
Book Review, Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan, by Pepper D. Culpepper
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书评《安静的政治与商业力量：欧洲和日本的公司控制》作者：Pepper D. Culpepper
DOI：
10.1093/ssjj/jyt004
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Manabu Matsunaka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
ブルース・アロンソン（松中学・訳;コメント）;Manabu Matsunaka
自Roe（2003）的工作以来，研究人员一直积极从事公司治理的政治分析。这一研究体系试图通过关注政治因素来解释国家间公司治理的差异以及一个国家内部公司治理的变化。卡尔佩珀的书主要通过引入显著性的概念，为公司治理的政治分析提供了一个新颖的框架。此外，卡尔佩珀的框架可以应用于公司法之外。然而，与任何研究一样，仍然存在一些问题。在这里，我主要从一个日本公司法学者的角度来回顾卡尔佩珀的书（关于其他学科的研究人员的评论，见施奈德2011；乔菲2012；戈耶2012）。卡尔佩珀介绍了突出性的关键概念。当公众（或者更准确地说，选民）关心某件事时，突出性就高，而当选民不关心这件事时，突出性就低。因为政治家们试图将连任的可能性最大化，所以当某件事的重要性很高时，他们就会像选民一样关心这件事。另一方面，在不那么引人注目的情况下，政客们不会那么关注这件事。即使公众不关心一个问题，也可能有一个利益集团对这个问题有很大的兴趣和丰富的知识。利益集团有很大的动机试图影响某一特定问题的规则制定，而政治家们往往在关注度较低时接受利益集团的意见。包括公司法在内的公司治理问题通常不太突出。一个拥有大量股份和大量知识的利益集团是企业，或者更准确地说，在公司控制权法律的情况下，是管理者。此外，一些关于公司控制权的斗争发生在正式立法之外。相反，这些法律和规则是作为非正式的制度而产生的
Since the work of Roe (2003), researchers have been actively engaged in political analysis of corporate governance. This body of research tries to explain differences in corporate governance among countries and changes to corporate governance within a country by focusing on political factors. Culpepper’s book provides a novel framework for political analysis of corporate governance, chiefly by introducing the concept of salience. In addition, Culpepper’s framework can be applied beyond corporate law. However, there remain some problems, as is usual in any research. Here, I review Culpepper’s book chiefly from the viewpoint of a Japanese corporate law scholar (for reviews by researchers in other disciplines, see Schnyder 2011; Cioffi 2012; Goyer 2012). Culpepper introduces the key concept of salience. Salience is high where the public (or more precisely, the electorate) cares about a given matter, whereas it is low when voters do not care about the issue. Because politicians try to maximize the possibility of reelection, when salience of a given matter is high, they care about the matter as voters do. On the other hand, in a low-salience situation, politicians do not attend to the matter as much. Even though the public does not care about an issue, there may be an interest group that has great interest and rich knowledge of the issue. The interest group has a significant incentive to try to influence rulemaking on the particular matter, and politicians are often open to input from the interest group when salience is low. Matters regarding corporate governance, including corporate law, usually have low salience. An interest group that has a significant stake and much knowledge is business, or more precisely, managers, in the case of laws on corporate control. Furthermore, some of the battles over corporate control occur outside of formal legislation. Rather, these laws and rules arise as informal institutions, defined